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PRIOR BAD ACTS AND TWO BAD RULES: THE
FUNDAMENTAL UNFAIRNESS OF FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE 413 AND 414
This note presents a Due Process analysis of Federal Rules of Evidence
413 and 414. These rules, which took effect in July 1995, overturn the
exclusionary requirements of Rule 404 exclusively in cases involving sexual
assault and child molestation. The new rules allow similar crimes to serve
as evidence for purposes other than those stated in Rule 404(b). Now, feder-
al prosecutors may offer evidence of a defendant's prior uncharged sexual
misconduct to demonstrate that the defendant committed the sex offense for
which he currently is being charged. Rules 413 and 414 reevaluate the his-
toric concern that evidence of prior acts is inherently unfair because such
evidence may allow judges and juries to make inferences of guilt based not
only on the evidence of the specific crime with which the defendant is
charged but on his past misdeeds as well.
After a discussion of the scope and effects of Rules 413 and 414, this
Note argues that such use of "propensity evidence" violates the Due Pro-
cess Clause because it is "fundamentally unfair." The rules, it is main-
tained, increase the risk of jury misdecision by allowing extremely prejudi-
cial evidence to be heard, arguably even without first being scrutinized
under the Rule 403 balancing test. This Note concludes that the new rules
must either be abolished or, at the very least, amended so that the prosecu-
tion is required to show that the probative value substantially outweighs the
prejudicial effect of the sexual propensity evidence.
INTRODUCTION
In July 1995, three new Federal Rules of Evidence took effect.' These
new rules, the product of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994,2 focus on sexual assault and child molestation cases.3 All
See FED. R. EvID. 413-415.
2 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13,701 et
seq. (1994)). Congress bypassed the normal rulemaking process, which usually involves
an Advisory Committee proposal, a period for public comment, Supreme Court adop-
tion, and Congressional review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994); FED. R. EVID. 1102; see
also STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET. AL., 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 575,
580, 583 (6th ed. 1994). Instead, the Act established a unique process by which the
rules would go into effect. The process allowed the Judicial Conference 150 days from
the date of enactment to recommend amendments to the rules. Id. If the Conference
failed to recommend any amendments, the rules went into effect 300 days after enact-
ment unless Congress provided otherwise. Id. If the Conference approved the rules, they
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three rules overturn the exclusionary requirements of Rule 4044 and thereby
lower the threshold for the admissibility of evidence that a defendant com-
mitted a prior act or acts of sexual assault or child molestation.5 Rule 413
provides that if a defendant is accused of sexual assault, evidence that the
defendant committed another sexual assault offense or offenses "is admissi-
ble, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is rele-
vant."6 Rule 414, which is structurally the same as Rule 413, applies to
went into effect 150 days after the approval was relayed, unless Congress provided
otherwise. Id. This mechanism was formulated to enable Congress to re-evaluate the
rules if the Conference made timely objections.
The Judicial Conference did report to Congress on February 9, 1995, recommend-
ing that the provisions of Rules 413-415 be in the form of amendments to existing
Federal Rules of Evidence 404 and 405. Report of the Judicial Conference of the Unit-
ed States on the Admission of Character Evidence in Certain Sexual Misconduct Cases
159 F.R.D. 51 (Feb. 9, 1995). The Conference stated that there was a need to "clarify
drafting ambiguities and eliminate constitutional infirmities." Id. at 52.
3 See FED. R. EvID. 413-415. These three evidence rules were introduced in section
231 of the "Molinari Bill," see H.R. 1149, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. 1400, 102d Cong.
§ 635 (1991); H.R. 3463, 102d Cong. (1991), sponsored by Representative James
Sensenbrenner (R-WI). The new rules finally were included in Title 28 of the Crime
Bill, Pub. L. No. 103-322 § 320, 935, 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37 (1994).
See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
6 FED. R. EVID. 413. The full text of Rule 413 follows:
Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual Assault Cases
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual
assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of
sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter
to which it is relevant.
(b) In a case in which the Government intends to offer evidence under this rule,
the attorney for the government shall disclose the evidence to the defendant, in-
cluding statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony
that is expected to be offered, at least fifteen days before the scheduled date of
trial or at such later time as the court may allow for good cause.
(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of
evidence under any other rule.
(d) For purposes of this rule and Rule 415, "offense of sexual assault" means a
crime under Federal law or the law of a State (as defined in section 513 of title
18, United States Code) that involved-
(1) any conduct proscribed by chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code;
(2) contact, without consent, between any part of the defendant's body or an
object and the genitals or anus of another person;
(3) contact, without consent, between the genitals or anus of the defendant
and any part of another person's body;
(4) deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction of death,
bodily injury, or physical pain on another person; or
(5) an attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct described in paragraphs
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child molestation cases.7 Rule 415 extends the scope of Rules 413 and 414
to civil cases.'
The policy goal of the new rules was to make it easier to prosecute
sexual assault and child molestation cases.9 The most frequently cited rea-
son given during arguments before Congress for the enactment of the new
rules was the need for more convictions of sex offenders." Congresswom-
an Susan Molinari (R-N.Y.), a leading advocate of the new rules, warned
her colleagues that the effect of leaving the Federal Rules as they were
would be "that serial rapists and child molesters go free."'1 Representative
Molinari mentioned the need to lower the probability of the "technical over-
turning" of cases on appeal when the trial judge has admitted evidence of
prior similar acts in sex offense cases. 2
The advocates of the new rules never clearly articulated the reason for
treating sex offenses differently than other offenses. Implicit in the legisla-
tive history is the notion that evidence of uncharged misconduct in sex of-
fense cases is more reliable than evidence of uncharged misconduct in other
cases, such as those involving the equally serious offenses of murder or
bank robbery. The data about recidivism, however, does not support the dis-
tinction between sex offenses and other serious offenses. 3 A sponsor state-
(1)-(4).
Id.
7 See FED. R. EviD. 414.
8 See FED. R. EvmD. 415. This Note focuses on criminal sex offense cases and
therefore does not include further reference to Rule 415.
9 The Kyl Sexual Assault Amendment to H.R. 4092, 140 CONG. REC. E584-02
(daily ed. Mar. 24, 1994) (statement of Rep. Kyl).
" Proponents of the new rules argued that Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prevent-
ed juries from hearing about a defendant's record of similar offenses. Rep. McCollum
(R-FL) stated that "there is a problem with the rules of evidence with regard to the
ability to produce the kind of background necessary to get rape convictions in this
country." 140 CONG. REC. H5440 (daily ed. June 30, 1994). Representative Molinari
said the new rules were "critical to the protection of the public from rapists and child
molesters" because they were "frequently critical in ... accurately deciding cases that
would otherwise become unresolvable swearing matches." 140 CONG. REC. H8991-92
(daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994).
11 140 CONG. REC. H2433 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1994).
12 140 CONG. REC. H5437 (daily ed. June 29, 1994).
'" A 1989 Bureau of Justice Statistics Report showed that the recidivism rate was
actually lower for sex offenders than for most other serious criminals. After tracking
100,000 prisoners for three years after their release, the Bureau reported that 31.9% of
released burglars were arrested again for burglary; 24.8% of drug offenders were rear-
rested for a drug offense; 19.6% of robbers were rearrested for robbery; but only 7.7%
of rapists were rearrested for rape. ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983, at 1 (1989); Roger C. Park & David P.
Bryden, The Twenty-Second Annual Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture: Uncharged Misconduct
Evidence in Sex Crime Cases: Reassessing the Rule of Exclusion, 141 MIL. L. REV.
1997]
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ment supporting the new rules emphasized that it is highly unlikely that a
person whose prior acts show him to be a rapist or child molester would be
falsely accused. 4 However, this argument should apply to most serious
crimes, not just sex offenses. 5
The rule against using character evidence to prove that a person behaved
in conformity with his or her character or "propensity" is a longstanding
rule of evidence that. has existed since the latter part of the seventeenth
century." The "propensity rule" is a part of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the California Evidence Code, and the evidence rules of thirty-seven other
states.17 In the remaining twelve states and the District of Columbia, the
propensity rule has persisted in the common law precedents. 8
Despite the fact that the character evidence prohibition is well estab-
171, 192 (1993). Other studies have revealed varying recidivism rates for different types
of sex offenders, but they have not shown a consistently higher or lower rate for sex
offenders relative to other serious crime categories. See Lita Furby et al., Sex Offender
Recidivism: A Review, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 27 (1989); see also Park & Bryden,
supra, at 171. But see Marnie E. Rice et al., Sexual Recidivism Among Child Molesters
Released from a Maximum Security Psychiatric Institution, 59 J. CONSULTING & CLINI-
CAL PSYCHOL. 381 (1991), which included a study showing a higher recidivism rate for
extrafamilial child molesters. These offenders were tracked for more than six years after
their release from maximum security psychiatric institutions; 31% were convicted of
another sex offense. Id.
Even if one argued that the studies understate the rate of recidivism for sex offend-
ers because many repeat offenders never are caught, see, e.g., A. Nicholas Groth et al.,
Undetected Recidivism Among Rapists and Child Molesters, 28 CRIME & DELINQ. 450
(1982), the same argument applies to drug offenders and bank robbers. Park & Bryden,
supra, at 192.
14 137 CONG. REC. S3240-41 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991). This sponsor statement actu-
ally describes the Comprehensive Violent Crime Control Act of 1991; however, the
proposed Rules 413-415 in the 1993 bill were the same as those in the 1991 bill.
15
If the defendant is accused of murder, would it not be a bizarre coincidence for
him to just happen to have been independently accused by three different people
of other murders? If a probabilistic exception is to be made to the rule against
character evidence in cases involving multiple accusations, then a consistent ap-
proach requires that the exception be made across the board.
Park & Bryden, supra note 13, at 193.
16 See infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text; see also McKinney v. Rees, 993
F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1020 (1993).
17 See McKinney, 993 F.2d at 1381 & n.2. The states that have codified the propen-
sity rule are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Ha-
waii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennes-
see, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
," See id.
PRIOR BAD ACTS AND Two BAD RULES
lished in America, 9 two primary developments have led to criticism of the
prohibition. The first was an increased awareness in the United States that
other common law jurisdictions have eliminated a strict character prohibi-
'tion.20 Commentators and jurists increasingly have agreed that the technical
exclusionary rules, which theoretically mitigate the danger of misleading the
factfinder, are not worth the trouble.2' The second. development was a reas-
sessment of the assumption that a person's character traits are poor predic-
tors of that person's conduct.22 At the inception of the drafting of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, the prevailing belief was that a person's environ-
ment largely determined that person's conduct.23 A new theory has
emerged, however, which posits that one can predict a person's behavior
after observing that person's conduct in similar situations.'
Although no American jurisdiction has followed England's example by
virtually abolishing the character evidence prohibition in all types of cases,
several jurisdictions have adopted new laws that partially dismantle the
prohibition. For example, the Missouri legislature adopted a statute that
19 See Edward J. Imwinkelried & Miguel A. Mendez, Resurrecting California's Old
Law on Character Evidence, 23 PAC. L.J. 1005, 1041 n.242 (1992) (citing California
cases dating to the mid-nineteenth century).
2 Cf P.B. Carter, Forbidden Reasoning Permissible: Similar Fact Evidence a De-
cade after Boardman, 48 MOD. L. REV. 29, 29 (1985). In Regina v. Boardman [19751
App. Cas. 421, the House of Lords relaxed the prohibition, stating that the amount of
probative value should be the decisive factor in determining the admissibility of un-
charged misconduct. Id. at 457.
21 See generally WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND
WIGMORE (1985) (describing Bentham's support of "free proof' and its influence on
modern scholarly discussion).
2 See David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense
Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 561-65 (1994).
' This once dominant theory is called "situationism." See Susan Marlene Davies,
Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of Relevancy, 27 CRIM. L.
BULL. 504, 514-15 (1991). Situationism rejects "trait theory." Trait theory posits that
underlying traits of character make behavior consistent in a variety of situations. See
generally WALTER MISCHEL, PERSONALITY AND ASSESSMENT (1968); 1 HUGH
HARTSHORNE & MARK A. MAY, STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF CHARACTER 411-12
(1928). For example, studies show that labeling a child as "deceitful" has little predic-
tive value because the child might lie at school but not at home or might cheat on a test
but not in sports. See HARTSHORNE & MAY, supra, at 411-12; Bryden & Park, supra
note 22, at 562. But cf Roger V. Burton, Generality of Honesty Reconsidered, 70 PsY-
CHOL. REV. 481 (1963) (reevaluating the Hartshorne and May study and concluding that
behavior exhibits a somewhat greater generality).
2 Davies, supra note 23, at 518-19. Called "interactionism," this new theory rejects
the contention that a person's character disposition has minimal predictive value. Id.
Rather, this'approach stresses the necessity of considering both the defendant's relevant
traits and the specific situation in determining subsequent behavior. Bryden & Park,
supra note 22, at 562.
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made "uncharged crimes involving victims under fourteen years of age...
admissible for the purpose of showing the propensity of the defendant to
commit the crime ... with which he is charged."' Indiana lawmakers sim-
ilarly enacted a statute allowing the admission of uncharged acts of child
molestation on a character theory of logical relevance.' At the federal lev-
el, Congress has created Federal Rules 413, 414, and 415, which abolish the
character propensity evidence prohibition in sexual assault and child moles-
tation cases.27
This Note presents a due process analysis of Federal Rules 413 and 414.
After a description of the scope and effects of the new rules, this Note ar-
gues that the "propensity rule" is deeply rooted in American jurisprudence
and is required to ensure "fundamental fairness" in the criminal justice sys-
tem. Furthermore, this Note posits that the admission of evidence of un-
charged sexual misconduct in sex offense cases is potentially so prejudicial
that it threatens the reliability of the jury's application of the constitutionally
required reasonable doubt standard. Accordingly, this Note concludes that
Rules 413 and 414, which abolish the propensity rule in cases involving
sexual assault and child molestation, violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
I. THE OPERATION AND EFFECTS OF RULES 413 AND 414
Generally, there are three ways in which a person's character may be
proved. The first is testimony regarding the person's reputation in the com-
munity for a relevant character trait. At common law, this was the most
commonly acceptable form of proof,' and today reputation continues to be
a generally approved method of proving character.' The second way to
prove character is through testimony by a person so familiar with the indi-
vidual as to possess a potentially valid opinion of an aspect of that
individual's character. Unlike the common law, under which opinion evi-
dence was restricted significantly more than reputation evidence," the Fed-
eral Rules make opinion evidence admissible whenever reputation evidence
2 Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.025 (1979 & Supp. 1997) (effective Jan. 1, 1995).
26 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-15 (1996). Note, however, that this statute was held to
be a nullity because it violated the principles set forth in Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d
1334 (Ind. 1992). Day v. State, 643 N.E.2d 1, 2-3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Brim v.
State, 624 N.E.2d 27, 33 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)).
27 See FED. R. EvID. 413-415.
8 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1983-86
(James H. Chadbourn rev. 1978). But cf id. § 1986 (calling reputation "the secondhand,
irresponsible product of multiplied guesses and gossip").
29 See FED. R. EvID. 405(a).
30 Cf Thomas J. Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts Evi-
denced in Federal Criminal Trials, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 713 n.1 (1981).
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is admissible.3 The third and most restricted way to prove character, both
at common law and under the Federal Rules of Evidence, is through evi-
dence of specific instances of a person's conduct that tends to reveal that
person's character.32 For example, one may seek to introduce evidence that
someone has punched another at a bar in order to indicate a violent charac-
ter.
When character is "in issue,"-when the substantive law makes the
character of a party a matter that must be proved in order to establish a
claim or defense-the Federal Rules impose few limitations on character
evidence.33 Rule 405(a) provides that if character evidence may be offered,
character may be proved using reputation or opinion evidence.' Part (b) of
Rule 405 states that when character is "an essential element of a charge,
claim, or defense," character may be proved using specific instances of
conduct.35 In conjunction, parts (a) and (b) make character provable by any
of these three methods whenever character is "in issue., 3
6
When evidence is used circumstantially to establish someone's character,
however, such evidence is subject to additional restrictions. In circumstantial
cases, for example, the Federal Rules allow opinion and reputation evidence
only when the evidence bears on the "truthfulness" or credibility of a per-
son, and even then such evidence is admissible only if the witness's charac-
ter for truthfulness is attacked. 37 Evidence of specific instances of conduct
to establish the credibility of a witness are also regulated tightly?8
Rules 413 and 414 make admissible what normally would be excluded:
character evidence in the form of specific prior acts to prove "any matter to
which [such acts are] relevant,, 39 including evidence that the defendant
possessed a trait of character that made it more likely that he-committed the
offense at issue. Such evidence offered to show that the defendant is the
kind of person who committed the crime which is now charged is "propen-
sity evidence." The comments of Representative Molinari demonstrate that
the goal of the new rules is to allow the use of propensity evidence in sex
offense cases:
31 See FED. R, EvID. 405(a) (stating that character may be proven by reputation or
opinion evidence whenever character evidence may be offered).
32 See infra text accompanying notes 37-38.
3 For a discussion of the relationship between rules of substantive law and rules of
evidence, see David P. Leonard, Rules of Evidence and Substantive Policy, 25 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 797 (1992).
FED. R. EVID. 405(a).
35 FED. R. EviD. 405(b).
36 See 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL
451 (6th ed. 1994).
37 FED. R. EviD. 608.
38 See FED. R. EvID. 608(b).
39 FED. R. EvID. 413(a).
1997]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
The past conduct of a person with a history of rape or child
molestation provides evidence that he or she has the combi-
nation of aggressive and sexual impulses that motivates the
commission of such crimes and lacks the inhibitions against
acting on these impulses. A charge of rape or child molesta-
tion has greater plausibility against such a person.4"
The effect that propensity evidence may have upon jurors in a criminal
trial is substantial. "Character propensity evidence creates an inferential
sequence within the minds of jurors that (1) the accused has a unique, ab-
normal propensity to commit certain acts; (2) that he acts on that propensity;
and (3) having done so repeatedly in the past he will do so in the future."4
As a result, the risk of unfair prejudice is great when propensity evidence is
presented to the jury. The jury is especially likely to punish the defendant
for being a "bad person" rather than for what he allegedly did on the partic-
ular occasion in question. Even if jurors do not think the accused is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, they might decide to convict "on the basis of
their disapproval of his prior crimes, on their hunch that he has committed
other crimes for which he was never caught, or their fear of letting him
remain on the streets to commit future crimes."42
Because of this substantial potential for prejudice, character propensity
evidence was made generally inadmissible by Rule 404."3 This rule prohib-
40 140 CONG. REC. H2433 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
41 Anne E. Kyl, The Propriety of Propensity: The Effects and Operation of New
Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414, 37 ARIz. L. REv. 659, 663 (1995).
42 James J. Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior Acts of Accused
Sexual Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95, 110
(1994).
43 Rule 404 reads:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity there-
with on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of the character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of
the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evi-
dence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution
in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformi-
ty therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
696 [Vol. 5:2
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its the use of evidence of past conduct to demonstrate character in order to
show action in conformity with character." Under Rule 404, therefore, evi-
dence of other similar crimes is not admissible when offered for the purpose
of suggesting that because the defendant is a person of criminal character, it
is more likely that he committed the crime with which he is charged. 5 An
important exception, embodied in 404(b), states that the general rule of
exclusion does not apply where, for example, the prosecution offers evi-
dence of the defendant's prior crimes not to show that he has a criminal
disposition but rather to establish circumstantially an element of the crime
charged. If the probative value of 404(b) evidence is not outweighed by
its tendency to cause undue prejudice under Rule 403, the evidence will be
admitted. 7
In order to admit evidence of prior sex offenses, courts sometimes are
willing to manipulate the 404(b) categories such as "motive," "intent," "ab-
sence of mistake," "plan," and "identity." '48 These categories form a gray
area in sex offense cases because they usually involve character propensity
inferences to some extent.4 9 Notwithstanding the liberal use of Rule 404(b),
it is still common for trial court decisions to be reversed because sex crimes
evidence was erroneously admitted."
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in
a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial
if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of
any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.




4' Rule 404 works in conjunction with Rule 403, which requires that the danger of
undue prejudice created by the admission of evidence of prior crimes be balanced
against the probative value of the evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 403; id. 404(b) advisory
committee's note.
48 See FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
4' Bryden & Park, supra note 22, at 541. For example, Bryden and Park argue that
when courts admit evidence of misconduct against third parties as evidence of motive,
they are really admitting character propensity evidence. After all, "[m]otive is not a
mystery in a sex crime case as it sometimes is in other crimes, such as murder." Id. at
544. Also, when the government offers prior misconduct evidence to prove intent, it
actually "seeks to create an inference that because the defendant has a continuing pro-
pensity [to commit an act], he had the forbidden intent on the occasion in question." Id.
at 551. In addition, misconduct evidence may be admitted for a purpose not listed in
Rule 404(b) because the listed purposes are meant only to be illustrative and not ex-
haustive. Id. at 556. Courts are inventive in creating new purposes. Id. One court upheld
the admission of the defendant's sexual misconduct against children because the evi-
dence demonstrated a pattern. Id. Admitting evidence under such a broad category is no
different than admitting otherwise inadmissible character evidence. Id.
"0 See Bryden & Park, supra note 22, at 560 n.137 (citing cases that held it improp-
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Some courts have gone completely beyond Rule 404(b) and its state
analogs by admitting evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct to demon-
strate "depraved sexual instinct" or "lustful disposition" in child molestation
cases.5 Other courts have held the "depraved sexual instinct" exception
violative of the prohibition against using character evidence to prove con-
duct.52 Among states that have adopted evidence codes modeled on the
er for the trial court to admit evidence of prior sexual misconduct by the defendant).
"I See Maynard v. State, 513 N.E.2d 641, 647 (Ind. 1987) (finding that uncharged
child abuse of a third party was admissible to show "depraved sexual instinct"), over-
ruled by Lannan v. State, 60 N.E.2d 1334, 1339 (Ind. 1992); State v. Lachterman, 812
S.W.2d 759, 768 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that admission of prior acts as proof of
"depraved sexual instinct" was proper in a case involving sodomy with young boys),
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 983 (1992); State v. Raye, 326 S.E.2d 333, 335 (N.C. Ct. App.
1985) (ruling that prior sexual misconduct with the victim's sister was admissible to
show intent and "unnatural lust" of the accused stepfather); State v. Edward Charles L.,
398 S.E.2d 123, 131 (W.Va. 1990) (holding that uncharged misconduct evidence was
admissible to show the accused's lustful disposition toward his children). See generally
John E.B. Myers, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Child Abuse Litigation, 1988
UTAH L. REV. 479, 540 & nn.205-06 (citing related cases).
At one point, it appeared that approximately 20 states recognized a special rule
permitting admission of prior acts in rape and child sex abuse cases. See Chris Hutton,
Commentary, Prior Bad Acts Evidence in Cases of Sexual Contact with a Child, 34
S.D. L. REV. 604, 614 n.47 (1989). Since the 1960s, however, courts in several states
have sought to dismantle or weaken this special exception. Sara Sun Beale, Prior Simi-
lar Acts in Prosecutions for Rape and Child Sex Abuse, 4 CRIM. L.F. 307, 312 (1993).
52 In Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind. 1992), Indiana's "depraved sexual
instinct" exception to the rule against character propensity evidence was invalidated.
The court held invalid the two bases for the exception: (1) the high recidivism rates in
child molestation cases, and (2) the desire "to level the playing field by bolstering the
testimony of a solitary child victim-witness." Id. at 1335. As for the first rationale, the
court, although acknowledging a high recidivism rate among sex offenders, believed the
recidivism rate among drug dealers to be just as high. Therefore, the court reasoned that
sex offenses should not be accorded special treatment. Id. at 1337. The court held that
the "bolstering" rationale was outdated because sex crimes were now more common,
and it no longer seemed "preposterous" that even a reputable citizen would "force him-
self sexually upon a child." Id. at 1337. The court added:
Sadly, it is our belief that ... we live in a world where accusations of child [mo-
lestation] no longer appear improbable as a rule. This decaying state of affairs in
society ironically undercuts the justification for the depraved sexual instinct ex-
ception at a time when the need to prosecute is greater.
Id.
Although some states have done away with the "depraved sexual instinct" excep-
tion, many continue to use it in child molestation cases. See, e.g., Reichard v. State, 510
N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ind. 1987) (holding that heterosexual rape evidence was inadmissible
under the "depraved sexual instinct" exception because rape of a female adult is not
depraved sexual conduct); Lehiy v. State, 501 N.E.2d 451, 453 (Ind. App.) (pre-Lannan
case) (finding that heterosexual rape evidence was not admissible under the lustful dis-
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Federal Rules,53 courts appear divided on the question of whether special
sexual propensity exceptions should stand in light of the provisions based on
Federal Rule 404(b).54
By allowing all relevant evidence of similar acts in sexual assault and
child molestation trials, Rules 413 and 414 go far beyond Rule 404(b) and,
much like the previously mentioned state exceptions, make the general rule
of exclusion inapplicable. The rules do not distinguish among the three basic
categories of prior misconduct evidence: (1) prior bad acts which resulted in
a criminal conviction,55 (2) prior bad acts for which the accused was ac-
quitted,56 and (3) conduct for which the accused has not been formally
position exception, but evidence of incest or sodomy would be admissible), vacated and
adopted by Lehiy v. State, 509 N.E.2d 1116 (Ind. 1987); State v. Tobin, 602 A.2d 528,
532 (R.I. 1992) (finding that the "lustful disposition" exception applied at least in cases
involving prior incestuous relations between the accused and the victim); State v. Ed-
ward Charles L., 398 S.E.2d 123, 133 (W.Va. 1990) (holding that evidence was admis-
sible to show a lustful disposition towards children).
" The following states have adopted evidence codes modeled on the Federal Rules:
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Loui-
siana, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, Washington, and Wyoming. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE § 1.2 at 4 (1994).
"' See Hutton, supra note 51, at 614-15 & nn.52-54 (stating that the exception did
not survive the adoption of Rule 404(b) but that Arizona, Nebraska, and Iowa have
taken contrary positions). Compare Edward Charles L., 398 S.E.2d at 133 (holding that
prior child sexual assault and abuse with same or different victims was admissible to
show lustful disposition toward a child or children generally), with Getz v. State, 538
A.2d 726, 733-34 (Del. 1988) (holding that the exception was contrary to Delaware
Rule of Evidence 404(b)).
" If a defendant was convicted of another sex crime, the prosecution may use the
conviction as impeachment evidence unless the trial judge determines that the jury is
likely to use the evidence improperly despite a limiting instruction. See FED. R. EVID.
609(a). When admitted for impeachment, the prior misconduct supposedly demonstrates
that the defendant is the type of individual who would lie on the witness stand, not that
he is the sort of person who would commit the crime for which he currently is charged.
Accordingly, the jury must be given a limiting instruction that it should .use this evi-
dence only to gauge the defendant's credibility, not to determine his culpability of the
charged offense. See Bryden & Park, supra note 22, at 534 & n.14. If the judge be-
lieves that the jury will misuse the evidence because, for example, the other crime is
similar to the charged crime, the evidence will be inadmissible for impeachment. See
FED. R. EvID. 609(a); 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 609[04], at 609-54 to 609-55. Nevertheless, similarity is a factor favoring
admissibility when evidence is offered because it shows such things as modus operandi
or plan under Rule 404(b). See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Therefore, it appears that "when
the felony is too similar to be offered to impeach, it is invariably similar enough to be
offered for substantive purposes." Bryden & Park, supra note 22, at 535 n.17.
56 In Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990), the Supreme Court held that
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Rules 413 and 414 proclaim certain character evidence to be "admissi-
ble," which leads one to question whether these rules should be interpreted
to override all the other rules of evidence.5" When interpreting the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the Supreme Court has employed a plain meaning stan-
dard.59 The plain language of the Rules is controlling irrespective of policy,
the admission of evidence of other criminal conduct of which the defendant had been
acquitted violated neither the collateral estoppel doctrine nor the due process test of
"fundamental fairness." As to the issue of fundamental fairness, the Court reasoned that
the trial court's authority to exclude potentially prejudicial evidence adequately ad-
dressed the possibility that introduction of such evidence would create a risk that the
jury would convict a defendant based on inferences drawn from the acquitted conduct.
Id. at 353. However, Rule 403 arguably does not apply to evidence of prior sexual
misconduct under Rules 413 and 414. Therefore, a judge would not have the authority
to exclude the evidence pursuant to Rule 403 in sex offense cases. See infra notes 58-
62 and accompanying text.
"7 Cf Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988) ("In the Rule 404(b)
context, similar act evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude that
the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor.").
5 Rules 413 and 414 state when evidence of prior sexual misconduct "is admissi-
ble," as contrasted with Rule 404(b), which states when certain evidence "may be ad-
missible." See Bryden & Park, supra note 22, at 566 (concluding that the applicability
of Rule 403 to evidence admitted under Rules 413-15 is "unclear"). Federal Rule of
Evidence 609(a)(2), however, was designed to supersede Rule 403 and does so by say-
ing certain evidence "shall be admitted."
In general, the remaining rules say what evidence is inadmissible "and often go on
to create an exception specifying when exclusion of such evidence is not required by
'this rule,' thereby explicitly leaving open the possibility that exclusion might be re-
quired by some other rule." Duane, supra note 42, at 117. Rules 413 and 414 add no
language, explicitly leaving open the possibility that the evidence, although "admissible"
under Rules 413 and 414, could be excluded under some other rule. See FED. R. EVID.
413, 414.
The primary sponsors of the new rules have said that the new rules only supersede
Rule 404 and that the other rules will generally continue to apply. See, e.g., 140 CONG.
REC. S12,990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole) ("The new rules will
supersede in sex offense cases the restrictive aspects of Federal rule of evidence
404(b)."); 140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, :1994) (statement of Rep.
Molinari) (same). This contention is not reflected in the language of either Rule 413 or
414. Although Rule 412, which immediately precedes Rules 413 and 414, specifies the
circumstances under which evidence of a rape victim's sexual behavior "is admissible,
if otherwise admissible under these rules," FED. R. EvID. 412(b)(1) (emphasis added),
the qualifier "if otherwise applicable under these rules" is not included in Rule 413 or
414. See FED. R. EvID. 413, 414.
'9 Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed
Rules of Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REV. 745, 745 (1990). Professor Jonakait argues that the
Supreme Court's application of the plain meaning approach to interpretation of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, "without regard to policy, history, practical operation of the
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history, or even practical operation of the law of evidence.'J Therefore,
"admissible" in Rules 413 and 414 cannot mean the same as "admissible, if
otherwise admissible under these rules," as used, for example, in Rule
412(b)(1).6 If Rules 413 and 414 bypass not only Rule 404 but the other
rules as well, Rule 403 would no longer apply to evidence of prior sexual
misconduct. As a result, a judge would not be able to exclude evidence
whose "probative value" was shown by the defendant to be "substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."62
II. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE, THE PROPENSITY RULE, AND RULES 413
AND 414
The United States Supreme Court recently stated that the issue of wheth-
er the use of character evidence to show propensity would violate the Due
Process Clause6 3 remains an open question.'M  Many lower courts have
law of evidence, or new conditions," id., will "significantly transform the evidentiary
landscape into a topography unforeseen and unintended by those who drafted and adopt-
ed the rules," id. at 749.
'o Id. at 745. Courts have no authority to follow "a single passage of legislative
history that is in no way anchored in the text of the statute." Shannon v. United States,
512 U.S. 573, 583 (1994). The Court often has repeated its contention that "[l]egislative
history is irrelevant to the interpretation of an unambiguous statute." Davis v. Michigan
Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 n.3 (1989) (citing United Air Lines v. McMann,
434 U.S. 192, 199 (1977)); see also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177
(1993); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992). But cf
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518 n.12 (1993).
6 See supra note 58. To assert that "admissible" in Rules 413 and 414 means the
same as "admissible, if otherwise admissible under these rules," as employed in Rule
412(b)(1), would contradict the Supreme Court's holding that it "construe[s] statutes,
where possible, so as to avoid rendering superfluous any parts thereof." Astoria Fed.
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991); see also Reves, 507 U.S.
at 177; Acosta v. Louisiana Dep't of Health and Human Resources, 478 U.S. 251
(1986). Furthermore, "'it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely"' when it "'includes particular language in one section of one statute but
omits it in another,"' City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328,
338 (1994) (quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993)), so that
the courts will hesitate to conclude that "the differing language in the two subsections
has the same meaning in each," Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983).
62 FED. R. EvID. 403.
63 The Fifth Amendment states that no person may be "deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment makes the Fifth Amendment due process requirement applicable to the states: "nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991) ("Because we need not reach
the issue, we express no opinion on whether a state law would violate the Due Process
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held that the admission of propensity evidence, including evidence of prior
sexual assault crimes and child molestation, violates due process under
certain circumstances and is a basis for habeas corpus relief.'
In Patterson v. New York," the Supreme Court held that a procedural
rule does not transgress the Due Process Clause unless "'it offends some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental."' 67 Two primary factors should be consid-
ered when evaluating whether a principle is "fundamental": (1) "historical
practice," and (2) whether the rule violates "any recognized principle of
'fundamental fairness' in operation."
68
A. Historical Practice
In determining whether a principle satisfies the "historical practice"
prong, a court considers whether the principle has "'deep roots in our com-
mon-law heritage., 69 Making character propensity inferences historically
was considered improper for a jury because the practice ultimately conflicts
with the presumption of innocence.7 The rule prohibiting admission of evi-
Clause if it permitted the use of 'prior crimes' evidence to show propensity to commit a
charged crime.").
6 See, e.g., McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1384-86 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1020 (1993), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364
(1995) (per curiam); Tucker v. Makowski, 883 F.2d 877, 878, 881 (10th Cir. 1989) (per
curiam); Stidium v. Trickey, 881 F.2d 582, 583-84 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1087 (1990).
432 U.S. 197 (1977).
67 Id. at 202 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958); Leland v. Ore-
gon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). In
Patterson, the Court rejected a due process challenge to a New York statute that placed
on the defendant in a criminal trial the burden of proving the affirmative defense of
emotional disturbance. Id. at 197.
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448 (1992).
69 Id. at 446.
70 David J. Kaloyanides, The Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory: An Example. of the
Propensity for Aberrant Application of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 25 Loy. L.A.
L. REv. 1297, 1305 (1970). Since the Restoration, see WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 58.2
at 1213 (Peter Tillers rev., 1983), and the English Treason Act of 1695, see Reed, supra
note 30, at 717 (1981), Anglo-American law has departed from Continental law, see
WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 58.2 at 1213-15, in providing that the accused be tried on
the charged act and not on his past crimes or any inferences about his character that
knowledge of those past crimes might create. See id. (providing examples of cases,
including Hapden's Trial, 9 How. St. Tr. 1053, 1103 (K.B. 1684) ("[W]e would not
suffer any raking into men's course of life, to pick up evidence that they cannot be
prepared to answer to") and Rex v. Oddy, 2 Den. Crim. Cas. 264, 169 Eng. Rep 501,
502 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1851) ("[I]t would have been evidence of the prisoner being a bad
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dence of specific acts to prove criminal tendencies originated in England.7
Early English criminal proceedings were not governed by rules limiting the
prosecution's introduction of potentially misleading and prejudicial evidence
against the accused.72 Indeed, it was common to admit evidence of charac-
ter to prove conduct.73
At the dawn of the eighteenth century, however, Parliament began to
reform these proceedings. 74 The Treason Act of 1695, which was designed
to dispense with the inquisitorial proceedings of the Star Chamber, 75 in-
cluded a provision that prohibited the prosecution from proving any alleged
crimes of the defendant that were not listed in the indictment.76 This princi-
ple of the Act, in conjunction with increasing legislative and judicial con-
cern for the rights of the accused, led to widespread adoption of the rule
barring the use of specific acts evidence to prove the criminal tendencies of
the defendant. 7 By the late eighteenth century, the propensity rule was
well established in England. Early cases demonstrated that the raison
man, and likely to commit the offenses there charged. But the English law does not
permit the issue of criminal trials to depend on this species of evidence")).
71 Many modern rules of evidence, such as the hearsay rule and the "best evidence"
rule, can be traced to sixteenth-century England. See STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READINGS
ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 12-13 (1988).
72 See id. at 13-14. In addition, the defendant could not cross-examine witnesses,
present witnesses on his behalf, or be represented by counsel at trial. Id. at 13.
"Historically, the use of bad general character appears as generally allow-
able-fitting, as it does, a more primitive notion of human nature. In England, it was
used without question down to the latter part of the 1700s." 3A WIGMORE, supra note
28, § 923, at 728 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1970).
71 Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71, 79-82
(1974).
" The Star Chamber proceedings, although ostensibly treason trials, actually were
used by the Tudors and Stuarts to do away with political and religious dissenters.
Therefore, the proceedings were biased against the accused. A panel of jurists would
base its decisions primarily on a written record compiled by the prosecutor. The ac-
cused was not allowed counsel at trial, and he was not permitted to answer his accusers.
For a more detailed discussion of the Star Chamber, see Reed, supra note 30, at 716-
17.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 717.
71 Citing William Hawkins, author of the oldest of the criminal treatises to discuss
the propensity rule, Chitty noted:
As we have seen that the evidence is to be confined to the points in issue, it is
clear that the prosecutor can adduce no proof of the defendants' general character,
unless that is the very scope of the charge against him. But where general charac-
ter is put in issue, facts relating to it may be admitted .... But evidence to char-
acter is more frequently called on the behalf of the defendant, and, in doubtful
cases, will often influence the jury to an acquittal. And even where the defendant
thus opens the discussion, the prosecutor can ask no questions as to particular
19971
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d'etre of the propensity rule was to protect the accused from the severe
prejudicial effect of past crimes evidence.79
The English colonists brought the propensity rule to America." Ameri-
can courts echoed English courts in their recognition that the admission of
otherwise relevant prior bad acts would be highly prejudicial to the ac-
cused."
In Michelson v. United States,82 the United States Supreme Court ac-
knowledged the common law propensity rule and its important rationale:
Courts that follow the common-law tradition almost unani-
mously have come to disallow resort by the prosecution to
any kind of evidence of a defendant's evil character to estab-
lish probability of his guilt .... The State may not show
defendant's prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts,
or ill name among his neighbors, even though such facts
might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a prob-
able perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected
because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to
weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them
as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a
fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge. 3
facts, but must confine himself simply to general reputation and character.
JOSEPH CHIITY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 573-75 (3rd Am. ed.
1836); see also SIR FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO
TRIAL AT Nisi PRUIS 296-296a (Richard Whaley Beidgman ed., London 1817); THOMAS
PEAKE, COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 6-7 (London 1804).
71 See, e.g., Rex v. Bond, [1906] 2 K.B. 389, 397-401 (discussing precedents apply-
ing the propensity rule). "Nothing can so certainly be counted upon to make a prejudice
against an accused .. .as the disclosure to the jury of other misconduct.... [I]ndeed,
when the crime alleged is one of a revolting character ... the prejudice must some-
times be almost insurmountable." Id. at 398.
80 See Westen, supra note 74, at 91-92.
8' See Coleman v. People, 55 N.Y. 81 (1873), in which the court stated:
A person cannot be convicted of one offence upon proof that he committed anoth-
er, however persuasive in moral point of view such evidence may be .... It
would lead to convictions, upon the particular charge made, by proof of other acts
in no way connect with it, and to uniting evidence of several offences to produce
conviction for a single one.
id. at 90; see 1A WIGMORE, supra note 28, § 58.2, at 1215 (Peter Tillers rev. 1983)
(noting "the overstrong tendency to believe the accused guilty of the charge merely be-
cause he is a likely person to do such acts [and] the tendency to condemn not because
the accused is believed guilty of the present charge but because he has escaped unpun-
ished from other offenses").
82 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
3 Id. at 475-76 (footnotes omitted). The Court reaffirmed Michelson in Huddleston
704 [Vol. 5:2
1997] PRIOR BAD ACTS AND Two BAD RULES 705
This common-law interest in protecting defendants from the prejudicial
effects of specific acts evidence became part of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.' The drafters of the Federal Rules were acutely aware of the poten-
tial for prejudice posed by specific acts evidence. Although Rule 403's bal-
ancing test might have been sufficient to prevent a prosecutor from intro-
ducing specific acts evidence in order to show a defendant's criminal pro-
pensity, the drafters apparently felt the need to go one step further in deal-
ing with the extreme prejudicial effect of such evidence." Accordingly,
they enacted Rule 404(b), which precludes a trial judge from employing the
403 balancing test when a prosecutor seeks to introduce evidence of an ac-
cused's prior misconduct.86 Propensity evidence simply is inadmissible.87
v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988).
8 The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence were influenced by the Uniform
Rules of Evidence and the A.L.I. Model Code of Evidence. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
RULES OF EVIDENCE: A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE ADVISABILITY AND FEASIBILITY
OF DEVELOPING UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS 53 (1962), reprinted in 1 JAMES F. BAILEY, III & OSCAR M. TRELLES, II, THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS, at
Doc. 4 (1980) ("The existence of these Uniform Rules and the A.L.I. Model Code of
Evidence and the related literature means that the draftsmen of the Federal rules will
not have to start from scratch.").
For example, the language of Rule 404(b) is 'very similar to the wording of Rule 55
of the Uniform Rules and Rule 311 of the Model Code. The Uniform Rules' version of
the propensity rule reads as follows:
RULE 55. Other Crimes or Civil Wrongs.
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a
specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit crime or
civil wrong as the basis for an inference that he committed another crime or civil
wrong on another specified occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48, such evi-
dence is admissible when relevant to prove some other material fact including ab-
sence of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge or identity.
UNIF. R. EVID. 55 (1953).
The language of the Model Code is similar:
Rule 311. OTHER CRIMES OR CIVIL WRONGS.
Subject to Rule 306, evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on
a specified occasion is inadmissible as tending to prove that he committed a crime
or civil wrong on another occasion if, but only if, the evidence is relevant solely
as tending to prove his disposition to commit such a crime or civil wrong or to
commit crimes or civil wrongs generally.
MODEL CODE OF EVID. Rule 311 (1942).
8 Generally, the trial judge may exercise broad discretion under Rule 403. See, e.g.,
United States v. Dwyer, 539 F.2d 924, 927-28 (2d Cir. 1976). But see United States v.
Meester, 762 F.2d 867, 874-77 (11th Cir.) ("Courts have characterized Rule 403 as an
extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly because it permits the trial court to exclude
otherwise relevant evidence."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1024 (1985).
86 If such evidence is introduced for another purpose, however, such as proof of
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Traditionally, therefore, the trial judge has not had the discretion to deter-
mine the relative prejudicial and probative values of specific acts evidence
offered by a prosecutor to show a defendant's criminal propensity.
B. Fundamental Fairness
The second question to consider in evaluating the rules is whether they
violate "any recognized principle of 'fundamental fairness' in operation. 88
In McKinney v. Rees,89 Michael McKinney sought habeas corpus relief on
the grounds that the use of what should have been inadmissible evidence of
other acts deprived him of a fair trial.9 The Ninth Circuit posed and then
attempted to answer the question that the Supreme Court had avoided:
"When does the use of character evidence to show propensity constitute a
violation of the Due Process Clause?"9' First, the court recognized that the
impermissibility of drawing propensity inferences from "other acts" evidence
of character was historically grounded in American jurisprudence. 92 Next,
the court observed that excluding propensity evidence was necessary to
force the jury, "as much as humanly possible," to set aside emotions and
prejudices created by that evidence and "to decide if the prosecution ha[d]
convinced them, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant [was] guilty
of the crime charged."93
The court believed that the evidence in the case was "emotionally
charged."94 The jury was offered the image of a man with a knife collec-
tion, who sat in his room sharpening knives, scratching morbid messages on
the wall, and occasionally walking around in camouflage with a knife
strapped to his body.95 According to the court, the evidence was introduced
only for its emotional impact on the jury, "lead[ing] them to mistrust
McKinney, and to believe more easily that he was the type of son who
would kill his mother in her sleep without much apparent motive., 96 The
court concluded that McKinney was convicted not because of the jury's
motive or intent, the judge then must decide "whether the danger of undue prejudice
outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other means
of proof and other factors appropriate for making decisions of this kind under Rule
403." FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's note.
87 Id. 404(b).
88 Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448 (1992).
89 993 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1020 (1993).
90 Id. at 1386.
9' Id. at 1384.
92 id. at 1380-81.
9' Id. at 1384.
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"careful analysis of logical inferences raised by the circumstantial evidence"
but because of McKinney's "suspicious character and previous acts."97
Thus, the admission of the propensity evidence violated what the Ninth
Circuit termed the "community's standards of fair play."9" The court con-
cluded that McKinney's trial was "so infused with irrelevant prejudicial
evidence as to be fundamentally unfair."99
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also has held that the pro-
pensity rule is enveloped in the principle of fundamental fairness. In United
States v. Burkhart," the defendant had been convicted of violating a fed-
eral statute prohibiting the interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehi-
cle."°1 The Court of Appeals held that the admission of certified copies of
prior convictions under the same statute for the purpose of proving intent
constituted reversible error.0 2 The trial court had instructed the jury that
the evidence of the prior convictions could be used only to show that the
defendant had the requisite intent to commit the crime.0 3 Although the
Court of Appeals recognized that evidence of other crimes could, in special
circumstances, be received to prove intent,' °4 it warned that the propensity
rule "is primarily a rule of exclusion of evidence and not one of admis-
sion. ' 10 5 Exceptions such as the intent exception "do not detract from the
general exclusionary approach which the rule demands." 1"
The Tenth Circuit cited three reasons for courts to be extremely cautious
97 Id.
98 Id.
9 Id. at 1386 (emphasis added).
458 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1972).
101 Id. at 202.
102 Id. at 208.
103 Id. at 203-04.
104 Although the Tenth Circuit decided Burkhart more than three years before the
July 1975 enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the evidentiary common law
rule discussed in this case was codified in the Federal Rules. In Burkhart, the trial court
admitted evidence of the defendant's prior convictions to show that he had the requisite
intent to commit the current offense. Id. at 203. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) estab-
lishes that evidence of specific acts offered for a purpose other than to prove a charac-
ter trait-such as plan, scheme, design, or intent-is admissible as long as the evidence
is not too prejudicial. FED. R. EvID. 404(b); see FED. R. EVID. 403; see also United
States v. Fortenberry, 860 F.2d 628 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 930 (1991).
0o' Burkhart, 458 F.2d at 204. The court determined that the government had failed
to meet the "essential requirement" that the intent be a common one in relation to the
crime charged. Id. at 208. The prosecution, it held, was required to show a connecting
link, based on factual similarity, between the case at trial and the similar offenses. Id.
Otherwise, the prosecution wrongly would be inviting an inference by the jury that
"once an accused has been adjudged to have a criminal turn of mind that this continues
until shown to have terminated or changed." Id.
106 Id. at 204.
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when dealing with propensity evidence. First, the accused must defend
charges not listed in the indictment" and already may have answered to
or served a sentence for the charges in the past."° Second, although the
evidence of prior misconduct may be relevant to the offense being tried, its
primary effect is to demonstrate the accused's criminal character."
"Showing that a man is generally bad has never been under our system
allowable" because "[t]he defendant has a right to be tried on the truth of
the specific charge contained in the indictment."" 0 Third, regardless of
whether the court uses extreme care in instructing a jury, once prior convic-
tions are introduced, "the trial is, for all practical purposes, completed and
the guilty outcome follows as a mere formality."". In sum, the problem of
admitting propensity evidence, said the court, "goes to the fundamental fair-
ness and justice of the trial itself.""' 2
Despite the determination by many federal circuit courts that the use of
character evidence to show propensity would violate the Due Process
Clause, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue. In Spencer
v. Texas,"3 the Court did hold that the introduction of past convictions
with a limiting instruction by a court stating that past convictions were not
to be taken into account in assessing a defendant's guilt or innocence was
not a violation of the Due Process Clause."4 Texas's recidivist statutes in-
creased the punishment of offenders found guilty of a crime who also were






112 Id. at 205. The court intimated that the propensity rule also has deep roots in
common law heritage, thereby satisfying the "historical practice" prong of Patterson v.
New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. The
court stated:
We have not been able to discover a precedent in either this Circuit or in the
Eighth Circuit prior to 1929, when the Tenth Circuit was created out of the
Eighth Circuit, which approves the use of a man's prior criminal history to show
commission of the same offense on a similar offense theory in the manner it was
done here.
Burkhart, 458 F.2d at 205.
Other federal appellate courts have considered due process-based challenges to the
admission of potentially prejudicial uncharged misconduct evidence. These courts simi-
larly have applied the general "fundamental fairness" test. See, e.g., Bryson v. Alabama,
634 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1981); Hills v. Henderson, 529 F.2d 397 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 850 (1976); Manning v. Rose, 507 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1974).
113 385 U.S. 554 (1967). This case was a consolidation of three habeas corpus cases.
114 Id.
15 See id. at 556 n.1 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 62-64 (West 1952), amend-
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prior crimes was admitted, and juries were charged that past convictions
could be considered only for purposes of sentencing (if the jury found the
defendant guilty) and not for the purpose of actually determining whether a
defendant was guilty under the present indictment." 6
The common complaint among the three petitioners in Spencer was that
the prosecution's use of prior convictions at trial "was so egregiously unfair
upon the issue of guilt or innocence" as to violate due process. 7 The
Court conceded the possibility of prejudice but believed that possibility to
be "outweighed by the validity of the State's purpose in permitting introduc-
tion of the evidence.""' 8 Ultimately, the Court based its decision on aspects
of federalism and the defendant's reliance on a more general due process
challenge rather than on a specific constitutional right:
[I]t has never been thought that [cases recognizing a due
process right to fundamental fairness in criminal trials] estab-
lish this Court as a rule-making organ for the promulgation
of state rules of criminal procedure. And none of the specific
provisions of the Constitution ordains this Court with such
authority. In the face of the legitimate state purpose and the
long-standing and widespread use that attend the procedure
under attack here, we find it impossible to say that because
of the possibility of some collateral prejudice the Texas
procedure is rendered unconstitutional under the Due Process
Clause as it has been interpreted and applied in our past
cases ....
In the procedures before us... no specific Federal right...
is involved; reliance is placed solely on a general "fairness"
approach. In this area the Court has always moved with
caution before striking down state procedures."'
Spencer may not, however, control the constitutionality of Rules 413
and 414. First, as Chief Justice Warren pointed out in his dissent, "the Court
never face[d] up to the problem of trying to justify this recidivist procedure
on the ground that the State would not violate due process if it used prior
convictions simply as evidence of guilt because it showed criminal propensi-
ed by TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997)).
116 Id. at 556. Subsequent to the convictions of the petitioners, Texas changed the
procedure so that in noncapital cases, a jury does not decide the recidivist issue unless
it first finds the defendant guilty of the charged crime. Id. at 556 n.2.
117 Id. at 559.
"" Id. at 561.
119 Id. at 564-65.
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ty. '"2 Rather, the Court reasoned that if evidence of prior offenses could
be offered to show such things as intent, motive, identity, or an element of a
crime, then such evidence also should be offered to further the state purpose
of enforcing the habitual offender statute.' Therefore, the Court merely
decided that the admission of evidence of the prior crimes in this particular
case was proper under the common law precursor to current Rule 404(b).
Second, Spencer arguably supports giving greater deference to state proce-
dures than the Constitution permits in the Court's review of the validity of a
federal procedure.' The decisiveness of the federalism concerns in
Spencer diminishes any controlling force that the case may have on a con-
stitutional analysis of Federal Rules 413 and 414.
Even if Spencer controls, Rules 413 and 414 should be found unconsti-
tutional. The Court stated that the Spencer defendants' interests were pro-
tected, inter alia, "by the discretion residing with the trial judge to limit or
forbid the admission of particularly prejudicial evidence even though admis-
sible under an accepted rule of evidence."'23 Therefore, although there was
no Rule 403 test at the time of the trials, judicial scrutiny still was allowed
to safeguard against unduly prejudicial evidence. No such safeguard exists,
however, under Rules 413 and 414. These rules, by making evidence of
prior sexual misconduct simply "admissible," remove the judge's discretion
to exclude prejudicial propensity evidence in sexual assault and child moles-
tation cases. Thus, in these types of cases, a defendant's interests no longer
are protected as they were in the opinion of the Spencer Court.
A third reason that Spencer may not control the constitutionality of
Rules 413 and 414 is that an analysis of these rules could proceed on the
basis of a "specific right" as well as the "general 'fairness' approach." Al-
though the Supreme Court has defined, very narrowly, the category of cir-
cumstances that violate fundamental fairness," it is clear that fundamental
fairness demands that the government "pro[ve] beyond a reasonable
doubt ... every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [a defen-
dant] is charged."' In In re Winship," the Court confirmed what had
long been assumed: a reasonable doubt standard is required in criminal
cases.'27 The reasonable doubt standard guarantees that "[the] government
120 Id. at 571 (Warren, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
121 Id. at 560-63.
122 The Supreme Court reaffirmed Spencer in Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422
(1983), and Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion reiterated the federalism concerns as
"[c]entral to our decision [in Spencer]." Id. at 438 n.6. Four dissenting Justices believed
"the only premises that even arguably support the holding in Spencer are no longer
valid." Id. at 457 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
l23 Id. at 561.
124 Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990).
125 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
126 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
127 "Expressions in many opinions of this Court indicate that it has long been as-
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cannot adjudge [someone] guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a
proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty."'" Grounded in the
standard is the "determination of our society that it is far worse to convict
an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."'"
Winship provided a clear basis for assessing the constitutionality of trial
procedures. Five years after Winship, the Court extended the Winship doc-
trine well beyond the formal burden of proof instruction to a jury in a crimi-
nal case to other procedures that effectively altered the burden of proving an
element of a crime.13 As a result, criminal due process entered a "new di-
mension" that called for "review of the substantive effect of procedural
devices on the state's burden of proof."' 3' Winship-based decisions have
concluded that a procedure is unconstitutional if it interferes with a
factfinder's application of the reasonable doubt standard to an element of the
crime charged.'32
The Supreme Court, in developing the Winship doctrine, has dealt pri-
marily with jury instructions on presumptions and inferences and the allo-
cations of burdens of persuasion.'33 The Court has not addressed directly
how Winship applies to preinstruction rulings on the admissibility of the
government's evidence. In 1972, the Court stated, in dictum, in Lego v.
TwomeyTM that Winship did not apply to preinstruction evidentiary rulings:
sumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally
required." Id. at 362. "Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of
the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." Id. at 364.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
130 In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), the Court unanimously affirmed a
decision by the First Circuit which set aside a state murder conviction because a proce-
dure unconstitutionally allocated to the defendant the burden of proving, in order to re-
duce the crime from murder to manslaughter, that he acted in a heat of passion on sud-
den provocation. Id. at 702.
131 D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional Challenge to the Treat-
ment of Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64 WASH. L. REV. 289, 297
(1989).
132 See, e.g., Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) (finding that a rebuttable pre-
sumption of intent unconstitutionally shifted the burden to defendant); Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) (finding that the mandatory presumption of intent is
unconstitutional). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that a court may review the
substantive sufficiency of evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jack-
son v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316-17 (1979) (requiring that the jury rationally apply
the reasonable doubt standard to facts in evidence).
13 See cases cited supra notes 130 & 132.
134 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
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Our decision in Winship was not concerned with standards
for determining the admissibility of evidence .... Winship
went no further than to confirm the fundamental right that
protects "the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to consti-
tute the crime with which he is charged."'35
Nevertheless, seven years later in County Court of Ulster County v.
Allen,'36 the Supreme Court, although speaking of "evidentiary devices" in
the context of inferences and presumptions, stated that the Winship test was
the "ultimate test of any device's constitutional validity.' ' 137 Furthermore,
in Lego, the Court was deciding whether Winship required that the
voluntariness of a confession be judged by the reasonable doubt stan-
dard. 3 The Court ruled that Winship principles did not apply because "the
purpose that a voluntariness hearing is designed to serve has nothing what-
ever to do with improving the reliability of jury verdicts.' ' 139 In other
words, admission of a piece of evidence, even when there is doubt about the
amount of weight that evidence deserves, normally will not pose a serious
threat to the required certainty about an accused's guilt because it is expect-
ed that the jury will rationally apply the reasonable doubt standard to the
totality of evidence. "Thus, for unexceptional evidence risks of unreliability
are accommodated by the expectations that factfinder rationality and the
reasonable doubt standard will safeguard against erroneous convictions."'40
This general principle does not, however, apply to "exceptional" evi-
dence that may threaten the process of rational and reliable decisionmaking
by a factfinder. Reliability is gauged by determining whether a procedure
threatens the certitude that an innocent person has not been convicted. Even
if a procedure may increase the possibility of obtaining an accurate convic-
tion, it is unconstitutional if it puts this certitude in jeopardy. Courts and
commentators generally agree that uncharged misconduct evidence can have
a decisive impact on criminal trials because of its influence on a jury's
factfinding process. 4' Jurors likely will find a greater probability connec-
135 Id. at 486 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)).
136 442 U.S 140 (1979).
137 Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
138 See generally Lego, 404 U.S. at 477.
139 Id. at 486.
140 Lewis, supra note 131, at 314.
41 See, e.g., EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 1:02
("Evidence of uncharged misconduct strips the defendant of the presumption of inno-
cence." (footnote omitted)); Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the
Character of Specific Acts Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REV. 777, 803 (1981) ("'[The general
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tion between a person's past misconduct and present culpability than is
warranted.'42 In addition, jurors unreasonably may disregard evidence of-
fered by a defendant because he was shown to be a contemptible per-
son. 43 There is also the danger that a jury might confuse the issue of an
accused's commission of uncharged misconduct with the question of his
culpability of the charged offense.'" The greatest risk is that a jury will
convict a defendant, even though guilt of the charged crime was not demon-
strated clearly , because the defendant was shown to be either deserving of
punishment for bad character or guilty of other misconduct for which the
defendant never received punishment. 5 Concern about this risk formed
the basis of the common law prohibition of propensity evidence. 6
rule is] that extrinsic acts evidence is fraught with dangers of prejudice-extraordinary
dangers not presented by other types of evidence."' (quoting United States v. Beechum,
582 F.2d 898, 920 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Goldberg, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 920 (1979))); Glen Weissenberger, Making Sense of Extrinsic Act Evidence: Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 404(b), 70 IOWA L. REv. 579, 581 (1985) ("Arguably no other
item of evidence ... possesses such enormous potential to affect the outcome of a
criminal case.").
142 See, e.g.,. RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN AP-
PROACH TO EVIDENCE 213 (1977); Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH.
L. REV. 1021, 1027-30 (1977); Weissenberger, supra note 141, at 602-04.
143 See, e.g., Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters,
70 YALE L.J. 763, 764 (1961).
Richard Lempert has pointed to the potential for prejudice from "double counting"
of uncharged misconduct evidence. See Lempert, supra note 142, at 1051-52 (1977). A
jury presumes to some extent that a defendant is guilty because the government has
charged the defendant with a crime. Id. As a result, says Lempert, if a defendant's un-
charged misconduct is of some relevance to guilt, that relevance is compounded by the
jury's initial skepticism about the defendant's innocence. Id.
'" See, e.g., LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 142, at 213.
145 See, e.g., IMWINKELRIED, supra note 141, at § 1:03; LEMPERT & SALTZBURG,
supra note 142, at 212; Kuhns, supra note 141, at 777-78.
146 In Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450 (1892), the Supreme Court recognized the
potential for prejudice that accompanies propensity evidence. The Court voiced "no
fewer than five of these concerns (surprise, misestimation, confusion of the issues,
arousal of punitive instincts, and interference with the guilt determination standard)."
Lewis, supra note 131, at 326 n.141. In Boyd, the defendants were charged with felony
murder for killing during the course of a robbery. The trial court admitted evidence of
recent robberies committed prior to the charged crime, with an instruction to the jury
that the evidence could be considered with regard to establishing the identity of the
felony murderers. Boyd, 142 U.S. at 456-57. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that
proof of the robberies "only tended to prejudice the defendants with the jurors, to draw
their minds away from the real issue, and to produce the impression that [the
defendants' lives] were of no value to the community . . . ." Id. at 458. The Court em-
braced the rationale behind the common law propensity rule: "However depraved in
character, and however full of crime their past lives may have been, the defendants
were entitled to be tried upon competent evidence, and only for the offence charged."
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The risk of jury misdecision seems to be particularly acute when a court
admits evidence of sexual misconduct or child molestation. A well-known
study of American juries by Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel supports this
observation.147 It describes the Chicago Jury Project, in which researchers
gauged jurors' reaction to a wide array of offenses. The researchers noted a
very high potential for prejudice in sex offense cases. 48 Many jurors ex-
pressed their outrage at such conduct, calling it "reprehensible." '149 The
researchers concluded that there was a real danger that jurors would "over-
ride[] distinctions of the law" to find the defendant guilty."' In other
words, jurors might be so outraged by a defendant's prior misconduct that
they would ignore "legal technicality" and make improper use of the emo-
tionally-charged evidence.
III. CONCLUSION
There is no Supreme Court decision that unambiguously defines the
boundaries of constitutionally acceptable uses of propensity evidence, espe-
cially in view of Winship's emphasis on reliability. In Spencer, four dissent-
ing Justices agreed that "evidence of prior crimes introduced for no purpose
other than to show criminal disposition would violate the Due Process
Clause,""'' but the majority never addressed this broad issue. Lower court
decisions like McKinney support the Spencer dissenters. Even if Rules 413
and 414 do not offend "fundamental fairness" in a broad sense, they are
fundamentally unfair under Winship, a decision that specifically imposes a
standard seeking to ensure the reliability of outcomes in criminal cases.
Rules 413 and 414 should be removed from the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence so that Rule 404 (along with the Rule 403 balancing test) will apply
to sexual assault and child molestation cases. Although there is no hard evi-
dence that even one guilty offender was set free because of supposedly
excessive limits placed upon federal prosecutors. by the current Rule 404(b),
it appears inevitable that the enactment of Rules 413 and 414 will increase
greatly the risk of convicting an innocent person. If there is still, in the
words of Justice Harlan, "a fundamental value determination of our society
that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go
free,"'5 then these rules must be repealed. The propensity rule must re-
main a firmly rooted principle in American criminal justice.
Id.
147 See HARRY KALvEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
148 Id. at 396-97.
149 Id. at 397.
150 Id. at 396.
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 574 (1967).
152 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Alternatively, if the new rules remain, they should be amended to in-
clude a stringent balancing test to determine the ultimate admissibility of
propensity evidence in sex offense cases. Such a balancing test should be a
reverse of current Rule 403, so that the prosecution will bear the burden of
showing a judge that the probative value of the propensity evidence it seeks
to introduce substantially outweighs the prejudicial effect it may have on an
alleged sex offender. This reversal of the 403 balancing test is necessary
because prejudicial evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct creates the risk
that a jury will alter the reasonable doubt calculus itself. A jury presented
with evidence of an accused's prior sexual misconduct may not be as cau-
tious about rendering an erroneous guilty verdict. If a jury expands the level
of doubt it finds acceptable for a conviction, it is likely to convict using a
standard of proof less than that required by Winship and the Due Process
Clause.153
Assuming arguendo that courts-contrary to the plain language of Rules
413 and 414-employed a Rule 403 balancing test before admitting sexual
propensity evidence under Rules 413 and 414, such a test would still be
insufficient to protect an accused from extreme prejudice and the high possi-
bility of jury misdecision. The pro-admission bias of Rule 403 often leads to
a "casual judicial attitude toward claims of prejudice from the admission of
evidence.'54 Courts, responding to the substantial bias toward admission
inherent in Rule 403, may fail to employ any Rule 403 balancing once they
have determined that evidence has probative value.'55 Moreover, under
Rules 413 and 414, courts no longer need to justify the admission of evi-
dence of uncharged sexual misconduct against claims of unfair prejudice by
choosing from the list of "other purposes" described in Rule 404(b).'56 By
requiring the government to show that the probative value of uncharged
sexual misconduct substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice,
courts would be more sensitive to the effects that sexual propensity evidence
may have on the reliability of a jury's decision.
JASON L. McCANDLESS
153 See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
' Lewis, supra note 131, at 356.
155 See, e.g., Victor J. Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evi-
dence,,18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 59, 61-63 & nn.6-11 (1984); Lewis, supra note 131, at
356.
156 See FED. R. EvID. 404(b); see also supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
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